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1. INTRODUCTION
The paper is concerned with the problem of Bayesian decision-makers
seeking consensus about the decision that should be taken from a decision
space. Each decision-maker has his own utility function and it is assumed that
the parameter space has two points, . The initial probabilities of
the decision-makers for can be updated by information provided by an
expert. The decision-makers have an opinion about the expert and this
opinion is formed by the observation of the expert's performance in the past. It
is shown how the decision-makers can decide beforehand, on the basis of this
opinion, whether the consultation of an expert will result in consensus.
Bayesian decision-makers, expert information
In this paper a parameter space with two points, and a decision
space are considered. There are decision-makers,
, who must reach consensus about a decision from
decision spacewhere each decision-maker has his ownutility function. In their
attempt to reach consensus the decision-makers may be able to consult
experts and tomake use of the information provided by these experts.
As in the papers of DeGroot and Fienberg (1983) and Garisch and
Groenewald (1996 and 2007), experts are considered as forecasters where
repeated predictions must be made. In this paper the decision-makers have
an opinion about each expert and since repeated predictions of the experts
are available, this opinion can be formed by looking at the expert's
performance in the past. Thus it can be assumed that the decision-makers
have a joint opinion about each expert. The view that an expert is not so much
a probability assessor, but a person with possibly some special knowledge
about the true state of nature, is adopted. This is also the way an expert is
defined by Morris (1977). So a “perfect” expert will nominate the true state of
naturewith probability one.
The view taken in this paper is that the decision-makers must reach
consensus about a decision from . Since utility functions are involved, each
decision-maker can calculate expected utilities when using the expert and on
the basis of these utilities decide beforehand whether to consult the expert or
not. It will be shown that the use of certain experts will result in consensus
among the decision-makers. By consensus is meant that the same optimal
decision is chosen by each decision-maker using his own utility and
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probability that equals as updated by the expert. This decision, whether
the consultation of a certain expert will lead to consensus, is based on the
opinion held by the decision-makers about the expert. It will be shown that in
the process the cost involved in the consultation of the expert and a possible
gain by the decision-makers if consensus is reached, are taken into account.
Thus the problem is to decide beforehand whether to use an expert or not,
because once an expert has given his opinion, it must be used since it is
information received.
The information provided by the expert can also be considered as virtual or
likelihood evidence that is incorporated in a Bayesian network as discussed in
Korb and Nicholson (2004). Other papers on the use of information provided
by experts are those of Lindley (1987) and Morris (1974 and 1977). In the
paper of DeGroot (1988) the problem of comparing expert opinions is
discussed. Papers on the reconciliation and aggregation of probability
assessments are those of French (1980 and 1981), Kahn (2004), Lindley
(1983) and Winkler (1986). In the paper of Fedrizzi et al. (1995), consensus
group decision-making is discussed.
Consider a single decision-maker, , and suppose the decision-maker
wants to update his prior probabilities of using information provided by an
expert. The parameter space of is and suppose that according to, .
Since an expert is considered as a forecaster where repeated predictions
must bemade, the probability that the expert is correct can be calculated from
his performance in the past. Let denote the probability that according to the
expert for Suppose
Since an expert is considered as a forecaster where repeated predictions
must bemade, the probability that the expert is correct can be calculated from
his performance in the past. Let denote the probability that
according to the expert for Suppose
,
and .
Nowsuppose evidence is entered that Then according to
and
where .
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Theposterior belief of can bewritten as can bewritten as
,where .
This indicates that it is not the likelihoods and that determine the new
belief, but rather the ratio : . Consider and , then the
posterior probability of will remain the same if . It should
also be noted that if , the opinion of the expert will have no
influence on the posterior probability since .
Suppose where Then where
. From the previous paragraph it follows that and can
be replaced by and where without changing the posterior
probability of .
Thuswithout loss of generality it can be stated that
and
where and 1 are the probabilities that the expert is correct and incorrect
respectively. Thus
If the prior is uniform, the posterior probability that is the same as the
probability that the expert is correct. Thus if , .
If the probabilities that the expert is correct and incorrect both equal 0.5, no
information is obtained from the expert. Thus if , .
The larger gets, the higher the opinion about the expert and themore
information is expected fromhim.A small value of
means that the expert can still provide a significant amount of information
even though he ismore likely to bewrong than right.
Consider decision-makers ,a parameter space,
and a decision or action space . Suppose according
to , , Should the decision-makers decide to
consult an expert, the posterior probabilities of can be
calculated. For these probabilities are:
and
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Suppose each decision-maker has his own utility function. For this utility
function is given inTable 1.
Table 1
Each decision-maker has his own optimal decision. The expected utility of
decision according to is
and the decision with maximum utility will be taken. Typically there will be no
consensus among the decision-makers about the optimal decision.
In this paper it is suggested that an expert should be consulted by decision-
makers if two conditions are satisfied. Firstly each decision-maker must
calculate utilities for the use of the expert and according to this decide to use
the expert and, secondly, the information provided by the expert must lead to
consensus among the k decision-makers about the decision that should be
taken from .
Consider the first condition and suppose each decision-maker adds the
decision to his decision space, where denotes the decision to consult
an expert. The utility function of is nowgiven inTable 2.
Table 2
The utilities and must be calculated by to decide whether to
consult an expert or not.
There may be a gain if consensus is reached and a cost involved in the
consultation of the expert. If denotes the cost, the gain, and for ,
then and are calculated as follows:
D
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If and , , then
chooses decision if .
Let and , where , then under the
first condition an expert is consulted if .
The second condition for the consultation of an expert is now considered.
Before the calculation of and each decision-maker has his
own optimal decision depending on the value where .
Suppose is the optimal decision for if
, , .
The values of and can be calculated easily for and .
Let
and
If and ,
and
.
If , and if , .
It must now be decided for which experts, in other words for what values of
, the posterior probabilities of will be updated in
such a way that consensus will be reached about the decision that should be
taken, irrespective ofwhat the expert says.
If according to the expert , the optimal decision for is if
,
thus if .
The optimal decision for all the is if
,
.
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where and .
Thus if ,
and according to the expert, , the joint optimal decision for the
is if .
Similarly it can be shown that if according to the expert , the joint
optimal decision for the is if ,
where .
Thus, irrespective ofwhat the expert says, consensuswill be reached by the
decision-makers if , , where .To conclude, an
expert should be consulted if .
The example given in Benjamin and Cornell (1970) will be used as an
illustration. In this example, as part of the foundation of a building, a steel
section is to be driven down to a firm stratum below ground. The problem is to
select a steel pile length when the depth to rock is uncertain. The available
actions are driving a 40 ft or 50 ft pile, and the possible states of nature are a 40
ft or 50 ft depth to bedrock. Suppose the contractor and engineer involved in
this project must reach consensus about the decision that should be taken,
where each has his own utility function. Suppose the utility function of the
contractor is given inTable 3 and that of the engineer inTable 4.
Table 3 Table 4
The optimal decision for the contractor is if the prior probability and
for the engineer if . Suppose the prior probabilities are
and , then decision is chosen by the contractor, and by the
engineer.
An “expert” is available in the form of an instrument which is used to do a sonic
test to give an indication of the depth, and suppose it is known that the
instrument is 70% reliable. Thus and . It must be
4. EXAMPLE
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decided by the contractor and the engineer whether this “expert” should be
consulted. Suppose for the contractor there is a cost of 10 involved in the
consultation of the expert and none for the engineer and the gain in reaching
consensus is 5 for the contractor and 1 for the engineer. If denotes the
decision to use this instrument, then it will be the optimal decision for both
decision-makers for all possible values of Thus ,
and the first condition is satisfied.
Consider now the second condition. Using the matlab package it can be
shown that the second condition will be satisfied if ,
thus if . Since, the two conditions are satisfied, and the
decision-makers shouldmake use of the instrument.
In Figure 1 the consensus decisions are given as a function of From the figure
it can be seen that if , the decision-makers will choose if
according to the expert (denoted by the *'s), and if the expert
indicates otherwise (denoted by the .'s). In the region , the decision-
makers will choose if (denoted by the *'s) according to the expert,
and if the expert indicates otherwise (denoted by the .'s). If no
consensuswill be reached.
Figure 1: Consensus decisions
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